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This article intends to stress out a fiscal matter, firstly explored by Puviani, known as 
fiscal illusion. This a case of observing and reacting upon key fiscal parameters, which 
could ultimately impose distortion of fiscal choices made by the electorate. There are 
numerous elements like tax structure, public expenditure, that are largely concealed so 
the voters don’t have the true information about the cost of providing certain public 
services. In the countries with high public expenditure there is a high rate of indirect 
taxes present, because they obscure the tax payer perception about the amount of tax 
paid. This is how they gather larger amount of tax revenues which are used for 
financing public sector. The high percentage of indirect taxes in public revenues affects 
the demand for public services, because the benefits are clear as day but not their 
expenses. That kind of misperception of public sector expenditures upon existence of 
indirect taxes is clear example of fiscal illusion. If the level of fiscal illusion is high, then 
the citizens are not in position to clearly see the government expenses which 
complicates the control of public money usage. The stimulus for money control is 
lower, because expenses are considered lower then they really are. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Almost 60 years ago, Downs (1957) considered that the representative voter poses imperfect 
information on which makes decisions on public-sector activities. The costs of acquiring 
information imply, of course, less than perfect knowledge for private-sector choices as well. 
According to him, the strives to gather information on the benefits and costs of government 
programs are fewer than those for private programs. The individual voter is very unlikely to 
have serious effect on public sector outcomes, which is why it doesn’t care about the benefits 
and costs of alternative government programs. The individual tries to acquire investment 
information through his his own pattern of purchases and consumption of private goods. But 
considering the public choices, there will be little effort in order to learn about government 
progams. As Downs (1957) concludes: 'Ignorance of politics is not a result of unpatriotic 
apathy; rather it is a highly rational response to "the faces of political life in a large democracy' 
[1]. 
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However, imperfect information does not mean fiscal illusion. It is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for its existence. Fiscal illusion refers to a systematic misperception of 
fiscal parameters - a recurring propensity, for example, to underestimate one's tax liability 
associated with certain public programs. Imperfect information alone might well give rise to a 
random pattern of over- and underestimation of such tax liabilities. Fiscal illusion, in contrast, 
implies persistent and consistent behaviour. As such, it will give rise to recurring, and 
presumably predictable, biases in budgetary decisions. It is by no means clear in which 
direction fiscal illusion will tend to bias public-sector outcomes. 
In the previous analysis was assumed that individuals value alternatives in a just way until to 
the degree anticipated with the individual behavior. This does not mean that only true observed 
factors are relevant, because then the institutional influence on the decisions would be 
neglectable. In addition, the institutions can influence on information’s, certainty in predicting 
certain outcomes, individual motivation for participation and other elements of choice without 
illusionary behavior. 
Behavior distinctions in case of ignorance and/or uncertainty and behavior in case of illusion 
is subtle. In either case, the behavior would not be the same in absence of event. If the voter 
does not possess adequate information for alternatives and is unsecure, then he treats 
alternatives imperfectly. If he is under illusion, then he will perceive alternatives on wrong way. 
However, the effects on his voting behavior may be identical. It looks that probability factors 
are more significant for the first, then the second situation. There is no need to use this aspect 
in order to made distinction in the results from several reasons.  
First, the illusion itself can be predicted with higher or lower certainty, then the one that real 
factors insinuate. Secondary, and even more relevant, the probability issues are subjective 
and can not be monitored. And at the end, both illusions can be pessimistic and optimistic [2]. 
The illusionary conduct is not irrational. The person that acts illogical makes inconsistent 
choices and does not behave like an external supervisor. Opposite of that, the individual that 
reacts in presence of illusion will be consistent, and in a given situation, in separate 
opportunities, he will intend to make the same decision, presuming that learning from 
experience will not affect the illusion and presuming that his function will not change in 
between. If the external observer knows the effects from the illusion on the voters conduct, 
then he can make the necessary predictions [3]. 
The illusion appears because of the perception of the alternatives from the individuals. 
Therefore, example for that kind of illusion will be the vision of water in the desert, a 
manifestation known as mirage. The artist, upon his knowledge, can intentionally create 
illusion, knowledge consisted from ordinary perceptions. It is obvious that institutions of social 
choice can create illusions and that’s why they are significant for study.   
 
2. The Contribution of Puviani. 
 
It is surprisingly that for so long time the fiscal illusion was not analyzed in detail. Institutions 
in which the individual must participate in order to make fiscal choices can create illusionary 
effects that could significantly modify his conduct. 
The Italian economist Amilcare Puviani had given the essential contribution in this area. His 
approach on public financing is based upon the assumption that the government is 
monopolistic. In fact, the state or political entity in this context are not envisioned as 
independent, “supra-individual” entity. The state represents agency through which one group 
of people, which poses power, influence or look down on other group of people, dominie. This 
is theory of political force, the model of governing class [4]. Political concept is more developed 
in details by Pareto and Mosca, who oversaw the citizenship divided in two groups, domineer 
and dominie. The concept is based on the impossibility to create effective democratized order. 
Under the model of government class, the fiscal structure is presented as institutional tool 
through which this class in charge for community decisions may extort funds from dominie 
groups for securing or funding those goods and services demanded by the first group. The 
 
 
3 
 
members of the dominee group may react on the newly found conditions, respectively never 
initiating action in direct sense. The group will oppose on the governing class efforts, term 
used by Puviani, to impose responsibilities and of course they will be less aware or will not 
collaborate with governing political group. The goal of this group is to create or organize the 
fiscal structure in order to minimize the resistance towards the effects on dominie class with 
securing solid revenues. 
Under such fiscal system, the assignment of the fiscal theorist will be to explain the governing 
class behavior in the organizational structure of the system in making fundamental decisions 
for public economy and explaining the conduct of the exploited class in the reaction and 
opposition of imposing tax responsibility.  
Puviani approached the theory of fiscal organization with the following question: If the 
governing group wants to minimize the resistance of tax complaint on every level of tax 
revenue, how will be able to set the fiscal system? 
He discussed the action undertaken by governing group motivated by short term goal, 
selection of alternative with lowest resistance on every individual choice. The answer of the 
question will be in form of hypothesis. The efforts of the governing group to generate fiscal 
illusions has effects on tax payers expressed with comprehension that taxes imposed to them 
are less burdening then they seem to be. Simultaneously, other illusions are created through 
which the users of goods and service are persuaded that their value is higher then the real. 
The numerous institutions for tax and expenditure are organized so they could create this set 
of illusions. Then Puviani had tried through existing fiscal structures to test the fundamental 
hypothesis.  
Fiscal illusion in implementation of new taxes. The illusion in implementation and collection of 
taxes can be illustrated in several specific ways, which are equally important and relevant [5].  
• correlation of the total amount of funds, which are actively used for production and 
supply of public services, and every individual share in this amount can be vague for 
the tax payer. In other words, individual shares in the opportunity costs of public 
expenditure can be hidden. This form of illusions can be generated in minimum five 
separate tax institutions. 
The first institution includes the use of public sector income for financing government 
activities. In this case, the individual tax payers didn’t figure out that if the income was 
not completely used for that purpose, then it would be returned in form of reduced tax 
rates. Historically, the public sector had acquired substantial amount of public 
revenues, but in the last century this kind of revenue source had become relatively 
omissive in capitalistic countries.  
In socialist countries, the profit of public enterprise is utilized for financing of public 
services, an illusion point out by Puviani again takes its place as a factor for persuading 
expansion of this form of services. 
The second institution is more significant for the analysis. The illusion is formed when 
the tax is taken in account when the individual makes payments for acquiring private 
goods and services. This situation is characteristic for specific taxes on consumption, 
where the tax is integrated in the price of private goods and services. The individual 
here needs to adjust his/her purchases so that the price, that contains the tax, be in 
the same proportion with any other price, as to the proportion of the relative marginal 
benefits of two private goods. The explicit acknowledgment of paid public goods and 
services is not included in the individual adjustment. Therefore, the subject it’s not 
completely aware for the amount of tax paid, and occasionally even for the total tax. 
According to this author, the illusion is more complete when the tax had been active 
for some time. When the prices of the private goods and services are increased as a 
result of tax, then the impact on the buyer would be evident. However, with the prevail 
of the institution in the upcoming periods, the opportunity cost would be neglectable by 
the tax payer. 
The third institution, that Puviani included in his broader category is public debt. He 
accepted the essential Ricardian suggestion that paying alone one-time tax and paying 
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certain percentage from this amount through yearly tax are eternally equivalent. 
However, according to him, individual tax payers does not behave like the two 
alternatives are same. He did not discus the potential mistakes of tax payers regarding 
the discount, capitalization, future tax payouts, like crucial elements in the process of 
public debt emission.  
He argued that there will be no defiance for new loan through emission of government 
securities intended for paying off yearly tax in the same way as through one-time tax. 
This kind of illusion emerges, because in case of public loan plan the subject detains 
supervision over capital value, which remains acceptable, even when is completely 
neutralized through obligations that emerge from the capitalization of future tax 
payments. Because of this asset control, the individual refers to pay taxes in future. 
According to Ricardo, government securities present future tax payments, which are 
equal to the discount face value of alternative tax payments on which place the debt 
was missioned [6]. Therefore, this fundamental equivalence between government 
securities and taxes does not cause any changes in tax payers’ behavior. That kind of 
“asset illusion” can be expanded towards private debt and public debt [7]. 
The fourth institution, that Puviani includes in his first, is financing public goods and 
services through inflation, i.e. emission of money. This form of funding is very difficult 
for the individual, because he or she would not be able to determine the own part in 
service costs funded and supplied by the government. This effect of inflation is similar 
with the indirect taxation under full employment. 
The final way through which the governing group, the one who controls fiscal 
measures, may generate illusion expressed with unclear participation of the subject in 
the total government expenditures is the false hope. This has for intention to persuade 
the individual to think that the various expenditure programs are with temporary status 
and short term, but when they are started the intention is to keep them in life. In this 
way the tax payer will be exposed to significantly higher expenses then originally 
expected. When the program initiates, then is relatively easy to present the argument 
“sunk costs” to the tax payer in order to secure extension for the program [a sunk cost 
is a sum paid in the past that is no longer relevant to decisions about the future. Even 
though economists argue that sunk costs are no longer relevant to future rational decision 
making, in everyday life, people often take previous expenditures, say, on repairing a car 
or house into their future decisions regarding those properties].  
• Not knowing the real costs for pubic goods and services it is not basic option for 
presenting fiscal illusion, although is one of the crucial. The second category includes 
those institutions designed for connecting the obligation with some issue or time frame, 
which the tax payer thinks it’s valuable. Puviani idea is based on recognition that the 
temporary circumstance may affect isolated individual decisions and consequently 
individual view can vary significantly under such conditions. Impulsive buying is also 
crucial phenomenon in marketing, but it’s role in making ordinary consumer choice is 
reduced due to recurrence of marketing activities. The individual does not “buy” 
voluntarily government services and with no impulse.  
Estate, inheritance and gift taxes fit just fine in this context. It is assumed that some 
rich uncle dies and leaves his inheritance from million dollars to his nephew, who did 
not anticipate the heritage. It is obvious that in the moment of announcement, the tax 
collection from this heritage would not be felt in the same way as it would be for paying 
regular tax after five years from the acquisition of the wealth.  
The same implies for transfer taxes. Probably every exchange embodies net gain for 
both sides in the transaction. Therefore, tax payment in the moment of finalizing 
transaction in presence of net gain tends to be less sensitive for tax payers in 
comparison with similar tax paid in deferent time.  
• Third mean for presenting fiscal illusion is collection of explicit fees for services offered 
in valuable or satisfied circumstances. He involved fees for marriage license, hunting 
license, entertainment license, fees for graduation, etc. Licenses for business, charged 
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in the beginning of the operation, can be explained through optimistic attitudes of all 
potential managers. 
• The dominant class will exploit the advantage in changes of public opinion for social 
matters and use those changes for establishing new taxes. If in the community prevails 
certain stand, then the circumstances for such tax collection will be based on that 
feeling. The tax burden will look smaller in comparison with different situation. 
According to Buchanan, Puviani surfaces his provocative hypothesis when suggested 
that taxes, aimed for redistribution of income, were happily accepted from the rich 
groups when they were threatened with demonstrations from the poor class. On the 
other side, there is some legitimacy in his argument that certain taxes are explicitly 
imposed in order to secure consensus from some groups for other social changes.  
For example, corporate tax is often implemented and justified before business groups 
as political gift for working class in order to secure political support for other issues. It 
seems that he did not make difference between “explanations” how some taxes 
appeared under political pressure and “explanation” for individual tax responses. 
• According to Puviani, the governing class in order to obtain general tax acceptance 
made threats to political entity with direct consequences in case of not approving tax 
collection. These “scary strategies” intended alternatives of some tax suggestions to 
be presented in worse light then they are. It seems that the degree in which this tactic 
will be effective will create fiscal illusion from the governing class, which could influence 
individual behavior. In modern fiscal environment, such tactics are more detected on 
the consumer side then tax side, because bureaucracy and citizenship may initiate 
catastrophic consequences if certain spending programs are not supported and kept. 
• If the individual total tax burden is fragmented in order to be able to face multiple small 
payments then several large ones, then it will create illusionary effects. If, for example, 
all taxes paid by the subject are concentrated in personal income, the individual will be 
more then aware for the sacrifice he makes for supporting government services. 
Therefore, fiscal systems in monopolistic states intend to be more complex and 
relatively less leaned on generally implemented taxes.  
• The last important tool for creating illusion on the tax size is implementing of taxes 
where the individual would not know who the last tax payer will be or where the tax 
incidence is not aware. This illusion relates to the first one discussed previously. It is 
obvious that this uncertainty in tax institutions is a result of unknown tax incidence, 
which affects the fiscal choice.   
Fiscal illusions in public expenditure. The essential analysis was extended on the consumers 
side of fiscal budget, besides the less applying conditions. The most important one was the 
government tendencies to conceal the truth and the real composition of the budget programs 
from the public eye.  
In the past, the possibilities for creating illusions on this manner were strongly stressed out 
because of the absence of systematic accounting and adequate budget technics. Even in 
contemporary budget systems, the complex budget makes it impossible to have detailed 
inspection.  
However, in best case scenario, the citizen stays with poor knowledge regarding allocation of 
public money. This elementary ignorance helps the governments to easily manipulate with 
budget positions through adding larger sum of money for programs that are most popular in 
public.  
Puviani’s hypothesis offer a new essential perspective of fiscal structure that can be useful 
even in case of implementation in modern government constitution. He worked on the 
assumption that the fiscal system was organized by the governing class – elite in the political 
society. In the modern extension of his ideas, Fasiani initiated debate for fiscal illusion in his 
study called “Public finance in monopolistic state”.   
However, it is assumed that the political structure is democratic and fiscal decisions are made 
by all members of political group through voting process regardless of his form – direct or 
indirect. Those political assumptions should not imply that Puviani analysis is worthless. 
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According to Fasiani, all traces of elite model are rarely exempted, which means that the 
analysis of Puviani is relevant according to his terms [8]. 
Buchanan considers that even in full democratic system, the fiscal institutions, regardless of 
motivation behind their original organizations, can be analyzed and sorted by their tendencies 
to generate fiscal illusions.  
Here it is analyzed the positive approach, who does not involve why political institutions act 
as they behave, but it observes them such as they are and then analyzes their effects. For 
such kind of approach, the form of political constitution it is irrelevant.  
 
3. Fiscal illusions in contemporary regimes 
 
All institutions, according to Puviani, were explained upon the illogical motivation of governing 
class to exploit the dominee class. Afterwards, it is concluded that his contribution was 
something more then explicit norms of fiscal organization. Then was developed tax principle 
for aggregate sacrifice (Edgewort and Pigou). This principle was recognized as like Puviani 
fiscal illusion. What is for the aim of fiscal illusion if not for minimizing the aggregate sacrifice 
of tax payer through minimizing the resistance of the tax payer? He was political realist who 
did not made scam through assumption that government is despotic and benevolent. Contrary 
of that, Edgeworth-Pigou principle can be applied simply in autocratic environment where the 
despot is completely charitable and powerful. That is obviously insignificant for the democratic 
structure where the despot is not interested in the tax payer’s reaction, that implies a lot of 
power in his domain. Edgeworth-Pigou or Puviani observed the tax side independent from 
expenditure side, which implies for nondemocratic framework. In democratic system, not even 
the “smallest aggregate sacrifice” or the “minimization of the burden through illusion” is 
suitable as a norm for fiscal organization. However, the norm should be allowing the 
individuals, through the structure of institutions for collective decision, to bye public goods and 
services on a manner so their choices could not disturb the production of goods and services 
on the private market so they could remain neutral and undisrupted as possible.  
The governing class of Puviani is attempting to promote optimistic illusions, i.e. the tax payer 
thinks that he pays less and in return receives more, then through alternative institutional 
arrangements. However, if all considerations for motivation are left aside and only the 
institutions are considered, then there will be no assumption that current fiscal illusions will be 
always optimistic, i.e. the appearance of pessimistic illusions is also possible.  
Income deductions for tax payment. After the World War II, in USA a large portion of personal 
income tax was collected through tax on wages and fees. The employer acts like tax collector, 
and the employee does not receive directly the proportion of his wage or fee, which is kept for 
tax purposes. These reforms in tax system of USA were exclusively supported by the 
argument for increase of tax payer benefits.  
Income deductions for tax payment would surely fit in the first category of Puviani institutions, 
which intend to present the opportunistic cost for supporting public services from tax payer as 
unclear. The person which does not have control over income before payment, could not 
sense the real cost for public services on a manner that is comparable with the original act of 
overpayment. Therefore, this illusion has influence on individual behavior on the same way as 
indirect tax.  
Before the introduction of tax payment through income deductions and paying upon earnings, 
the individual was forced to pay the whole sum of yearly tax obligation in one moment. This 
approach probably generated pessimistic illusion and contributed in presenting government 
expenses in overdosed amount.  
From conceptual aspect, the ideal institutional agreement may be the one which allows the 
individuals to pay for government goods and services on a way which they consider as most 
suitable for achieving long-term finance of consumption. The absence of logical feeling for 
transfer, the absence of every monthly or quarterly account is just the thing that causes income 
deduction to be questioned and tends towards illusion [9].  
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Progressive rates of income tax. The pessimistic illusion can be generated on the same 
manner as the optimistic one, especially when the system organization it’s not conducted 
without specific design for illusion. It seems that the progression has the tendency to create 
excessive feeling of tax burden upon the tax payer. The effect here derives from disagreement 
between average and marginal tax rate and preserved tendency of people to think alike 
marginal rates conditions. If this illusion is present, then the press would discuss about the tax 
structure and the politicians would have tax debates.  
From some reason, the marginal tax rate presents relevant tax rate for analyzing individual 
choices. With the acclimatization on private sector behavior, the individual taxable income 
would depend from the marginal tax rates. However, in the efforts to select adequate amount 
of public goods, the individual must think with accordance of average tax rates, while in 
meantime the necessities of total income vary.  
Namely, if public goods and services are disposable according to some schedule for negative 
quantitative discounts, which is the case in increasable marginal price, then he can think and 
respond wrongful guided by progressive tax structure.  
However, the implication from the hypothesis here is that the individual could strive to select 
larger quantity of public services under the model of proportional income taxation then under 
the progressive model, although his/her tax obligation is identical. 
Social insurance taxes. It is obvious for all individuals that without detailed analysis and 
knowledge of the system, the effects of promoting institutions in the area of insurance, which 
imply insurance independence and integration, would have for purpose to conceal the real 
flows of costs and benefits from participants. The facts are that the system as independent 
account of trust fund extracted from regular budget procedures, it’s not heathy from insurance 
point of view in the process of implementing private financial standards and that the plan will 
depend from continues will of the treasury to finance the current demands towards the system. 
Those individuals who contribute to the system, finance relatively small portion of received 
benefits, and the rest of funds must be obtained from current taxes charged from the potential 
users.  
While the current collaborator accepts regular increases of his own taxes, as those calculated 
on his employer, under the assumption that those will be accumulated for support of pension 
benefits, so more he will be less resistant on such increases if he knew that those tax increases 
were necessary for current payouts of beneficiary’s. It works with illusion like that of Puviani. 
If the future demands against the system are correctly discontinued together with the future 
taxes that will be imposed on them, then the participant in the system would recognize that in 
net value the costs would significantly surpass the benefits calculated in face value. The fact 
that there is no disbursed resistance against entering the system, it supports the hypothesis 
that illusion is present and effective, even for the employee who is capable to recognize the 
bankruptcy of the insurance system. 
However, if he predicts that for the time of his retirement other potential participants can be 
attracted by illusionary insurance demands, then he will not be rationally motivated to reject 
the plan. On that manner, the system secures long-term assets through which can be made 
income transfers for older people with the help of productive population, which can be 
explained or rationalized to many tax payers based on cooperative plans for retirement 
protection [10]. 
Taxation of corporation income. Taxes imposed on corporate income have tendency to create 
large insecurity for the ultimate tax payer, which is enough to be considered by the last 
category od Puviani.  
Taxation of capital gains. The treatment of capital gains under the income tax is closely 
connected with the problem of medium. One reason for continued favorized treatment of profit 
is the absence of effective average fees in the regular income tax. According to model of 
Puviani, it is obvious that taxes should be more imposed on profit, then on regular income.  
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4. Conclusions 
The fiscal illusion has shown us through this paper that can make serious distortions in the 
process of public decision, based on the fiscal variables that are publicly available to the voter. 
Precisely that sort of government approach in publicly concealing the real situation with the 
fiscal variables had been the initial problem of getting valuable information from the individual 
voters in order to make the proper fiscal decision. For example, paying taxes or demanding 
higher amount of public expenses for things that are essential for them. This illusion is 
disbursed in the segment of public revenues, and in the segment of public expenditure. This 
kind of distortion can create false picture for the state of the economy, which also would mean 
false perception from the public about their costs and benefits from the government. This form 
of government illusion may be dangerous, because it would stimulate the government to make 
or prolong the process of making bad decisions (about the public debt, tax rates, public 
expenditures, etc.) 
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